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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
BROOKS BRADSHAW,

CaseNo.20020137-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appealsfromfour convictions for attempted communicationsfraud,third
degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-102(3) & 76-10-1801 (1999).
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue 1: Do subsections 76-10-1801(2) & (5) of the communications fraud statute
permit each communication made in furtherance of a scheme to defraud to be charged as a
separate criminal offense, the degree of which is determined by the total value of all property
or monies obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme to defraud?
Interpretation of statutory provisions, including their constitutionality, is a question
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, <f 5.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Issue 2: Do the variations of racketeering in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603(1) & (2)
(1999), require proof that the proceeds derivedfroma pattern of illegal activity were invested
to further the criminal scheme or used by someone other than defendant?
See standard of review applicable to statutory interpretation, Issue 1, supra. Whether
a criminal charge is subject to pretrial dismissal is a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 8,20 P.3d 300 (applying correctness standard to
a denial of a motion to quash a criminal information).
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Determinative provisions are attached in Addendum A and include:
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-10-1602 (1999) - Definitions - Racketeering Enterprises
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (1999) - Unlawful Acts - Racketeering Enterprises
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (1999) - Communications Fraud
United States Constitution, Amendment V - Double Jeopardy
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 2,2000, defendant was charged with second degree felony racketeering
and eleven counts of second degree felony communications fraud (R. 1-11). Defendant
waived preliminary hearing and was bound over for trial (R. 74). Based upon the parties'
stipulation as to what the preliminary hearing testimony would have been if witnesses had

4

been called, defendant subsequently moved to reduce the degree or number of the
communicationsfraudcharges and to quash the racketeering charge (R. 76-84,85-94). See
<

I
2
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Addendum B (Stipulation). The trial court denied the motion (R. 117; R.156: 3-9).l See
Addendum C(Ruling). Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas
to four reduced charges of attempted communicationsfraud,third degree felonies, reserving
his right to appeal the denial of his motion to reduce and/or quash the charges (R. 119-20,
128; R.157: 2-9). The remaining eight felony charges were dismissed (R. 119,128; R.157:
3,7).
On January 15, 2002, defendant was sentenced to four concurrent terms of zero-tofive years imprisonment and ordered to make full restitution (R. 140-42; R. 158: 13). On
February 12, 2002, defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 143).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of defendant's motion to reduce and/or quash the charges, the parties
stipulated to the testimony which the State would have presented if defendant had not waived
preliminary hearing (R. 76-84) (Addendum B).
In sum, the stipulation establishes that in 1998, defendant's real estate appraiser's
license was revoked based on his "pattern of inflating property values for the purpose of
defrauding by means of false orfraudulentpretenses" (R. 83).
Beginning in January 2000 and continuing through June 2000, defendant falsely
represented himself to be a co-owner or to have a financial interest in existing mortgage

1

The record does not contain written findings and conclusions, however, the
parties stipulated to the facts and the court entered a complete oral ruling (R. 76-84;
R.156: 3-9). See Addenda B & C
3
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companies, including Classic Mortgage and In-Time Funding (R. 1-11, 76-82). The owners
of the companies knew defendant, but he was not associated with or employed by the
mortgage companies (R. 83).
Using the false representations of his business status, defendant approached some
fourteen victims who were facing foreclosure or otherwise needed to refinance their homes
(R. 76-82; R.158: 12).2 In each case, defendant falsely represented that he could obtain
refinancing for the homeowners) if the homeowners) would pay defendant a fee ranging
from $400 to $500 for a title search, credit check and other necessary documentation (R. 7682). The victims paid defendant the requested fee, but no documentation was ever prepared
and no refinancing was sought or obtained (id.).
Brett Kennedy and William Thomas worked with defendant and witnessed
defendant's misrepresentations to some of the victims (R. 82). Additionally, defendant
solicited Thomas to "falsely represent himself as an appraiser" to one of the victims (id.).
When defendant was confronted by a criminal investigator from the Attorney
General's Office, defendant admitted he had defrauded the victims (R. 83-84). He also
admitted that he used the illegal proceeds to "pay his personal bills" (R. 84).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Communications Fraud: One subsection of Utah's communications fraud statute
plainly permits each communication made in furtherance of a scheme to defraud to be

2

Some victims were married couples and combined in a count, resulting in eleven
counts of communications fraud, but fourteen named victims (R. 1-11).
4
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charged as a separate offense. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(5) (Addendum A). Another
subsection of the same statute plainly directs that the total value of the monies obtained or
sought to be obtained by the scheme be combined to determine the degree of any offense.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-10-1801(2). Defendant admits the two subsections are clear, but

claims that whether they should be applied together is ambiguous. According to defendant,
he constitutionally may be charged with eleven counts of class A misdemeanor
communications fraud, based on the value of the individual sums he obtained from each
victim, or one count of second degree felony communicationsfraud,based on the aggregated
value of the total monies received from all victims, but he may not be charged with eleven
counts of second degree felony fraud.
Defendant is wrong.

Established rules of statutory construction require two

subsections of the same statute to be read together and for a statute to be read as a whole so
that no portion of the statute is rendered superfluous or inoperative. When read as a whole,
section 76-10-1801 is not ambiguous: subsection (2) governs the degree of any offense
charged, while subsection (5) governs the number of offenses which may be charged. Nor
is section 76-10-1801 unconstitutional: subsections (2) & (5) simply reflect a legislative
prerogative to consider not only the injury caused by afraudulentscheme, but also the nature
and breadth of the scheme in determining culpability.
Because section 76-10-1801 is both plain and constitutional, the trial court properly
denied defendant's motion to reduce the degree or number of the charged counts of
communications fraud.
5
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Racketeering: Utah's racketeering statute prohibits "any person/' who as a principal
receives proceeds from a pattern of illegal activity, from directly or indirectly using the
illegal proceeds in the operation or control of an "enterprise." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-101603(1) & (2) {Addendum A). Statutorily, an individual may be an enterprise and, under
section 76-10-1603( 1) & (2), that individual may be the principal who receives the funds may
be the same. Here, defendant, who falsely held himself out to be legitimately associated with
existing mortgage companies, was both the principal who received the funds and the named
enterprise.
Based on the posture of this case, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion
to quash the racketeering charge. Defendant waived preliminary hearing and then, for
purposes of his motion, proceeded on limited stipulated facts. Those facts established that
defendant, by misrepresenting his business status and associations, obtained over $5000
through a pattern of illegal activity and used the illegal proceeds to pay "personal bills." As
the trial court correctly ruled, sections 76-10-1603(1) & (2) do not require proof that the
illegal proceeds were used to further the criminal scheme or that the funds were used by
some entity other than defendant. While more evidence might be required for conviction,
alleging that defendant, as the principal and the enterprise, used the illegal funds to pay bills
was sufficient to avoid pretrial dismissal.

6
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH'S COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
STATUTE PERMITS EACH COMMUNICATION TO BE CHARGED
AS A SEPARATE OFFENSE, THE DEGREE OF WHICH IS
DETERMINED BY THE TOTAL MONIES OBTAINED OR SOUGHT
TO BE OBTAINED BY THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD
Defendant concedes that one subsection of Utah's communications fraud statute
permits each communication made in furtherance of a scheme to defraud to be charged as a
separate criminal offense (R. 85-86 & BriefofAppellant [BrAplt] at 12). See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-1801(5) (1999) (Addendum A). Defendant also concedes that another
subsection of the same statute directs that the degree of the offense is determined by the total
monies obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme (R.155: 5-6 & BrAplt at 12). See
UTAH

CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(2) (Addendum A). Nevertheless, defendant claims that

nothing in section 76-10-1801 directs that its two subsections be read together and that the
statute is, therefore, ambiguous (BrAplt at 10-12). According to defendant, the prosecutor
must elect between charging him with eleven counts of class A misdemeanor
communications fraud based on his havingfraudulentlyobtained $400-5500 from eleven
victims, or charging him with one second degree felony based on his having obtained in
excess of $5000 in his overall fraudulent scheme (BrAplt at 8, 12 & 16). Defendant's
interpretation conflicts with established rules of statutory construction.
It is well-recognized that "[w]hen interpreting statutes, [a court's] primary goal is to
evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, U 8
7
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(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accord State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,
110,452 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. The best evidence of a statute's meaning is its plain language,
which the court must assume was selected "advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary
meaning. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 8. "'When language is clear and unambiguous, it must
be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.'" Hardy, 2002 UT
App 244, f 10 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P. 872, 875 (Utah 1995)).
Moreover, courts must look to all provisions of a statute to "'avoid interpretations that will
render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'" Martinez at f 8 and Hardy at f10
. (both quoting Hall v. Utah DepL of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, f 15,24 P.3d 958).
Subsection (1) of section 76-10-1801 states:
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false
orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of
[communications fraud].
Subsection (2) directs:
The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)
except [when the object of the scheme is other than the "obtaining of
something of monetary value"].

A

Here, it is undisputed that defendant devised a scheme to obtain monies in excess of $5000,
i

which constitutes a second degree felony {BrAplt. at 12). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-101801(l)(d) (classifying as a second degree felony, a scheme in which more than $5000 is
i

8
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obtained) (Addendum A). Defendant claims, however, that no matter how many victims
were involved or communications made, subsection (2) only permits one aggregated felony
to be charged (Br.Aplt. at 8,12 & 16). Defendant's interpretation of subsection (2) ignores
subsection (5).3
Subsection (5) of section 76-10-1801 provides:
Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing
a scheme or artifice describe in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of
communication fraud.
Again, defendant admits that if read alone, subsection (5) permits him to be charged with
eleven separate criminal offenses - a separate offense based on each communication and/or
victim (Br.Aplt. at 11-12 & 16). But defendant asserts that if multiple charges arefiled,the
charges must be only class A misdemeanors based on the value of the money obtained from
an individual victim (Br.Aplt. at 77-72). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(l)(b)
(classifying as class A misdemeanors schemes in which more than $300 but less than $1000
is obtained) (Addendum A). Specifically, defendant argues that the multiple charges
permissible under subsection (5) cannot be aggregated under subsection (2) to eleven felonies
because section 76-10-1801 contains no express language directing that the subsections be

3

Below, defendant also argued that because section 76-10-1801(1) spoke in terms
of a "scheme or artifice to defraud another" subsection (2) only permitted aggregation if
one victim was defrauded multiple times, not multiple victims defrauded once (R. 87-88).
The trial court rejected the argument because singular statutory terms necessarily include
the plural (R. 98; R.156: 3). See State v. Kazda, 382 P.2d 407, 409 n.3 (Utah 1963)
(citing what is currently designated as UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-12(l)(a) (Supp. 2002)).
On appeal, defendant does not challenge this portion of the trial court's ruling.
9
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read together (Br.Aplt. at 12). According to defendant, without such language, the
communications fraud statute is ambiguous and he is, therefore, entitled to the most lenient
interpretation of its penalties (Br.Aplt. 11-16).
(A) Defendant Is Not Entitled To Lenity Because No Ambiguity Exists.
Relying on his argument that the interplay of subsections (2) & (5) of section 76-101801 is ambiguous, defendant asserts that the "rule of lenity requires this Court to construe
the statute in [his] favor" (Br.Aplt. at 11). Utah appellate courts have not formally
recognized the "rule of lenity" as a rule of statutory construction. Instead, after interpreting
a statute, Utah courts have applied the "rule of lenity" to accord a defendant the lesser of two
applicable penalties. See State v. Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, f 8, 14 P.3d 129 (quoting
Statev. Yates, 918 P.2d 136,138(UtahApp. 1996), and applying the rule to give a defendant
the "benefit of the lesser penalty afforded by an amended statute made effective prior to
sentencing"); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah App. 1997) (same).
Some jurisdictions recognize lenity as a formal rule of construction: "when the
Legislature fails to indicate the allowable unit ofprosecution and sentence with clarity, doubt
as to the legislative intent should be resolved in favor of lenity for the accused." State v.
Green, 534 S.E.2d 395, 403 n. 13 (W.Va. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). But even when recognized as a guide to statutory construction, the rule "only
serves as an aid for resolving ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. The rule comes
into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the
beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers." United States v.
10
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Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 n.10 (1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It
is unclear if Utah has adopted this application of the rule, although it clearly has recognized
the concept of lenity. See State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694,696 (Utah 1981) (without using the
term "rule of lenity," citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955), for the
"presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of the penal code against the
imposition of a harsher punishment"); State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969)
(without using the term "rule of lenity," recognizing "that where there is doubt or uncertainty
as to which of two punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the
benefit of the lesser").
In any case, all courts agree that a defendant is not entitled to lenity unless a statute
is ambiguous. See Turkette, id. (concluding that rule of lenity was inapplicable because no
statutory ambiguity existed); Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, f 10 ("where the statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning to
divine legislative intent") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Green, 534 S.E.2d
at 403 n. 13 ("[b]ecause we find the statutory text to be unambiguous... we do not consider
the rule of lenity"). Accord Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, f 10 ("[w]hen language is clear and
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for
construction") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, no ambiguity exists.4
4

Defendant claims that the prosecutor conceded that the statute was ambiguous
(Br.Aplt. at 12). She did not. She consistently argued that the statute was clear, but
forthrightly informed the court that "we've had [district] courts go both ways" on the
issue (R. 98-107; R.155: 9). This is, however, the first case to raise the issue on appeal.
11
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Defendant's argument that section 76-10-1801 is ambiguous is premised on a
fundamental fallacy, that is, that express language is necessary to combine application of two
subsections of the same statute. To the contrary, subsections of the same statute - and even
different statutes governing the same subject - are necessarily read together under established
rules of statutory construction. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 11. Additionally, a statue must be
read to give harmonious meaning to each of its provisions, without overlooking any terms.
Id. at f t 8 & 11. See also cases cited, supra at 7-8.
Read together, subsection (5) plainly governs the number of offenses permitted to be
charged, while subsection (2) plainly governs the degree of each of those offenses. See
discussion, supra at 8-9. Consequently, lenity does not apply.
Moreover, because it is the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and
punishments, this Court may not "comment on the legislature's wisdom" in enacting criminal
statutes. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 15. Nor is a penalty susceptible to challenge merely
because it is more severe for some variations of a crime than others. Cf. State v. Mace, 921
P.2d 1372, 1377 (Utah 1996) (recognizing that an appellate court "may not require the
legislature to select the least severe penalty possible"). Indeed, the legislature may impose
harsher penalties on certain crimes even if logic does not compel them to do so. State v.
Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that "[i]t is not unconstitutional for a
state to impose a more severe penalty for a particular type of crime than the penalty which
is imposed with respect to the general category of crimes to which the special crime is related
or of which it is a subcategory"). See, e.g.9 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(l)(e) (making
12
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communicationsfrauda second degree felony whenever the object sought to be obtained by
the scheme is "other than the obtaining of something of monetary value"); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-6-412( 1 )(a)(iv) & (b)(iii) (1999) (making theft of any itemfrom"the person of another"
a second degree felony and theft of a chicken or any livestock a third degree felony)
(Addendum A).
Defendant complains that multiple aggregated felonies are not allowed in other
jurisdictions (BrAplt. at 13-16 & 21). Defendant also contends that allowing multiple
aggregations is inconsistent with Utah's charging schemes in theft and forgery cases (BrAplt.
at 20-23)} While Utah's communicationsfraudstatute is somewhat unique, its approach is
not fatally inconsistent with other Utah provisions or non-Utah jurisdictions.

More

significantly, nothing requires a statute to be consistent with the penalties applicable to a
different crime.
Defendant asserts that federalfraudprovisions do not permit aggregation (BrAplt
at 15). This is correct, but defendant fails to state why. Federalfraudcounts do not need to
be aggregated because all mail, wire, and communicationfraudsare felonies regardless of
the amount of money obtained. See 18 U.S.C.§§ 1341 & 1343 (makingfraudscommitted

5

Additionally, defendant asserts that permitting multiple felony counts would be
inconsistent with precedent from this Court, to wit, State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah
App. 1997) (BrAplt at 21). This is incorrect. Ross did not address the permissibility of
multiple felony charges because Ross was only charged with one aggregated felony. Id.
at 238. By comparison, in State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 776 (Utah App. 1990), Tebbs
was charged with multiple felony communicationsfrauds,but it is unclear whether any
were based on aggregated value. As noted previously, supra at 11 n.4, no Utah appellate
court has addressed the issue.
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by use of the mail, wire, radio, or television punishable by up to a million-dollar fine and 30years imprisonment). At the same time, under federal law, each communication made in
furtherance of a fraud may be charged as a separate crime. Badders v. United States. 240
U.S. 391, 394 (1916); United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).
Consequently, if this were a federal offense, defendant could be charged with eleven felony
fraud counts, just as he is under state law.6
It is also true that some jurisdictions only permit aggregation in the alternative, that
is, charging multiple lesserfraudsbased on individual values or one greaterfraudbased on
an aggregated value. But those jurisdictions are governed by the specific wording of their
statutes. See, e.g.9 FLA. STATUTES § 817.034(3) & (4) (2000) (permitting aggregation to
determine the degree of the crime of "organizedfraud"(racketeering),while not providing
for aggregation in communicationsfrauds,but designating all communications frauds over
$300 as felonies, and permitting separate judgments and sentences to be imposed for
racketeering and for each communication made as long as both involved the same scheme)7;
State v. Fournier, 617 A.2d 998, 999-1000 (Me. 1992) (interpreting Maine statute which

6

In the same argument, defendant discusses section 76-10-180 Ts legislative
history and intent {BrAplt. at 14-15). That discussion is irrelevant because the language
of the statute is plain. See Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 8; Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, f 10.
In any case, the minimal legislative history supports that the Utah legislature
contemplated a statute comparable to the federal. See Br.Aplt, Addenda I&J. Under
either statutory scheme, defendant's actions support eleven counts of felony fraud.
7

Under Florida law, defendant could be charged with eleven counts of third degree
felony communications fraud and one count of racketeering.
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states that multiple thefts may be "aggregated to charge a single theft of appropriate class or
grade" to mean thefts involving the same victim could be aggregated into a single theft
count) (emphasis added); Goodwin v. State, 738 S.W.2d 1,5 (Texas App. 1987) (interpreting
Texas statute which states that thefts involving one scheme but different victims may be
"considered as one offense and the amounts aggregated in determining the grade of the
offense" to mean that multiple theft convictions merged for purposes of sentencing)
(emphasis added). Or, the decisions do not involve fraud, but theft, which has a different
analytical underpinning. Accord Patience, 944 P.2d at 391 (recognizing that theft focuses
on the "end" accomplished (the value taken) and is, therefore, governed by the "single
larceny rule," which requires multiple thefts to be consolidated as one; but the larceny rule
has no application to other crimes, such as forgery, which focus on the "means" by which the
crime is committed). Compare, e.g., State v. Joles, 492 So.2d 490,493-494 (La. 1986), cert
denied, 479 U.S.I 056 (1987) (interpreting theft statute as permitting multiple theftsfromthe
same victim to be aggregated into one charge or charged as multiple lesser offense).8

The language of Louisiana's theft statute is similar, though not identical, to
Utah's communications fraud provision. Compare Joles, 492 So.2d at 491, with UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (Addendum A). But as noted, theft is traditionally governed by
the "single larceny doctrine." Patience, 944 P.2d at 391; Barker, 624 P.2d at 695. Other
crimes - especially those involving distinct acts with distinct victims - are not. Id.
Therefore, Joles' interpretation of its theft statute has little application here.
Moreover, the legislature may permissibly view a number of small crimes as
seriously as a larger crime and devise a punishment scheme accordingly. Joles, 492
So.2d at 494. Defendant accepts this premise, but extrapolates that he is being
impermissibly treated as severely as someone who stole $5000 from 11 different people
(Br.Aplt. at 13-14); Defendant is correct that he faces the same charges as a person who
obtains more money from the same number of victims, but fails to acknowledge why. (n.8
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Moreover, while some state jurisdictions permit, but do not mandate, the aggregation
of individual frauds into a single count, they also designate all communications fraud,
regardless of value, as felonies. See, e.g., ARIZ. STATUTES §§ 13-2310(D) & 13-1801(B)
(2001) (designating any communications fraud, regardless of value, as a class 2 felony, but
permitting multiple fraud, "whether the amounts were taken from one or several persons,"
to be aggregated into a single count, in the discretion of the prosecutor, so that if $100,000
or more is obtained, sentence may not be suspended and probation may not be imposed).9
Consequently, comparison to other jurisdictions provides little guidance here.
Likewise, defendant's comparisons to Utah's theft and forgery provisions are of no
avail (Br.Aplt. at 22-23). Theft and forgery are distinct crimes, ruled by specific statutes
which do not include section 76-10-1801 fs language-l0 Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-

cont.) Utah's fraud statue punishes equally all schemes in which $5000 or more is
obtained. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(l)(d) (setting $5000 as threshold amount
for second degree felony and not providing for any higher level of punishment)
(Addendum A). Thus, the person who defrauds 11 people of $5000 each faces the same
magnitude of charges as the person who defrauds 11 people of one million dollars each.
Similarity of treatment is not prohibited; indeed, the federal and some state schemes treat
all frauds as felonies regardless of the value obtained. See discussion, supra at 13-14 and
infra at n.9.
9

Because aggregation is discretionary under Arizona law, defendant could also be
charged with eleven counts of felony communications fraud in Arizona.
10

Below, defendant claimed that communications fraud and theft by deception
were similar crimes and, pursuant to Shondel, 453 P.2d at 147-48, he was entitled to the
more lenient punishment (R. 90-91). The trial court rejected this argument because
communications fraud and theft by deception are not identical crimes (R.156: 4). See
State v. Fedorowcz, 2002 UT 67, f 47,452 Utah Adv. Rep. 22; State v. Bluff, 2002 UT
66, f 33, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. On appeal, defendant does not challenge this part of the
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412 and 76-6-501 (1999), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (Addendum A). In contrast,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521(2) & (4) (1999) (Addendum A\ governing insurance fraud,
specifically adopts the communications fraud charging scheme. While this portion of the
insurance fraud statute has not been judicially interpreted, section 76-6-52 Ts specific
reference to section 76-10-1801 evidences the legislature's understanding that the charging
scheme permissible for communications fraud is something different and distinctfromthat
found in Utah's general theft or forgery provisions.
In sum, section 76-10-1801 reflects the legislature's prerogative to consider not only
the injury caused by afraudulentscheme, but also the nature and breadth of the scheme in
determining culpability. Cf. State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145,148 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing
legitimacy of legislature providing greater punishment for computer fraud simply because
computer crimes are "difficult to police and have a greater potential for ruinous
consequences").
(B) Section 76-10-1801 Clearly Establishes The Unit of Prosecution.
Of course, the legislative prerogative to define crimes and punishments must be
exercised within constitutional parameters. In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, a
court is obligated to presume the statute valid and "resolve any reasonable doubts in favor
of constitutionality.'9 Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 6 (citation and internal quotation marks

(n.10 cont.) ruling. Instead, his complaint appears to be more general, i.e., that multiple
aggregated counts of communications fraud should not be permitted because theft and
forgery may not be charged in this fashion.
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omitted). Moreover, a "'statute should be held valid unless there is a clear, complete and
unmistakable violation of some provision of the constitution."1 Tebbs, 786 P.2d at 778
(quoting Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 481 P.2d 669, 670-71 (Utah 1971)).
Here, defendant argues subsections (2) and (5) cannot both apply because such a result
would punish him twice for the same offense and, thereby, violate the federal prohibition
against double jeopardy (BrAplt. at 16-19). More specifically, defendant contends that
section 76-10-1801 does not clearly define the allowable "unit ofprosecution" and, therefore,
the statue is ambiguous and defendant entitled to lenity (BrAplt. at 17-18). Defendant also
contends that the charges are multiplicitious, that is, he is being charged multiple times for
the same act (BrAplt. at 23-24). Because section 76-10-1801 plainly defines the allowable
"unit of prosecution" and that unit permits multiple felonies to be charged, defendant's
constitutional arguments fail.11
The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution prohibits multiple punishments for
the same offense.12 State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221,1230 (Utah 1998), This variation of

11

For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts that permitting multiple charges
based on the aggregate value of a scheme also violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (BrAplt. at 16-20). Because defendant
did not raise this issue below (R. 85-94; R.155: 5-7), it is waived on appeal and the State
does not address it See Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, f 15.
12

Defendant's argument is predicated on the Fifth Amendment, with only nominal
reference to the comparable state constitutional provision (R. 89 & BrAplt at 16-18).
Separate state constitutional analysis, therefore, is waived. See State v. Pixel, 1999 UT
App 270, f 4 n. 1, 987 P.2d 1288. In any case, state and federal double jeopardy
provisions are co-extensive. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998).
18
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double jeopardy, commonly referred to as "multiplicity," "prohibits the Government from
charging a single offense in several counts and is intended to prevent multiple punishments
for the same act." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, f 24, 31 P.3d 547 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Whether charges are multiplicitious is resolved by determining
the allowable "unit of prosecution" intended by the legislature for a given crime. Bell, 349
U.S. at 82. This, in turn, is resolved by the plain language of the statute. State v. Adel, 965
P.2d 1072,1074 (Wash. 1998) (recognizing that while determination of the designated unit
of prosecution is of "constitutional magnitude," it is ultimately resolved by statutory
interpretation and legislative intent). Indeed,
[t]he protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause place few, if any,
limitations on a legislative body's power to delineate criminal offenses and fix
their punishments. . . . rather, the prohibition merely acts to ensure that
sentencing courts do not exceed, by the device of multiple punishments, the
limits prescribed by the legislative branch of government, in which lies the
substantive power to define crimes and prescribe punishments.... A claim
that double jeopardy has been violated based on multiple punishments imposed
after a single trial is resolved by determining the legislative intent as to
punishment. . . . In other words, the Double Jeopardy Clause takes the
substantive criminal law as it finds it.
Green, 534 S.E.2d at 400.
Here, the legislature clearly defined the allowable "unit of prosecution." As stated,
section 76-10-1801(5) directs that every communication made in furtherance of the scheme
is a separate offense. Section 76-10-1801(2) specifies that the degree of an offense is
determined by the total value of the scheme. Defendant is not, as he claims, being punished
for the same act eleven times (R. 89-90 & Br.Aplt at 17-18). Each criminal act, each
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communication to a different victim, is punished only once, but the degree of punishment for
that individual act is determined by the overall value of the scheme. See discussion, supra
at 8-12. From a penalogical perspective, the result is no different than designating all
communications frauds, regardless of value, as felonies and then prosecuting each
communication made in furtherance of thefraudas a separate offense - a statutory scheme
followed federally and by some jurisdictions. Defendant implicitly admits this scheme is
permissible.
In sum, the plain language of section 76-10-1801 permits the number of offenses to
be determined by the number of communications made and the degree of any offense to be
determined by the overall value of the scheme. This allowed defendant to be charged with
eleven counts of second degree felony communications fraud. The trial court, therefore,
properly denied defendant's motion to reduce the number or degree of the fraud charges
(R.156: 3-4) (Addendum Q.
POINT II
THE FIRST TWO SUBSECTIONS OF UTAH'S RACKETEERING
STATUTE DO NOT REQUIRE PROOF THAT PROCEEDS DERIVED
FROM A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY WERE USED TO
FURTHER THE CRIMINAL SCHEME OR USED BY SOMEONE
OTHER THAN THE DEFENDANT
Like many states, Utah has a racketeering statute patterned somewhat on the federal
RICO scheme. See State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 101 n.l (Utah 1988). Utah's scheme, like
the federal, recognizes four general theories of prohibited activities: (1) the use or investment
of income derived from a pattern of illegal activity in the acquisition or maintenance or
20
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operation of a statutorily-defmed enterprise; (2) the acquisition or maintenance of any
interest in or control of a statutorily-defmed enterprise; (3) the employment by or association
with an enterprise whose affairs are conducted through a pattern of unlawful activity; or (4)
a conspiracy to violate any of the prior three provisions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603
(1999) {Addendum A). Only the first two theories are at issue in this case (R. 1-11,109-11).
Section 76-10-1603 reads, in pertinent part:
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has receive any proceeds derived,
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the
person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived
from the investment of use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest,
or the establishment or operation of any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise.
(Addendum A). For purposes of both subsections, a "person" is defined as "any individual
or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."

UTAH CODE ANN. §

76-10-1602(3) (1999) (Addendum A). An "enterprise" is defined as "any individual, sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes
illicit as well as licit entities."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-10-1602(1).

Despite these statutory definitions, defendant moved to quash the racketeering charge
because he claimed that an individual cannot "invest" in himself or another human being
without violating the anti-slavery laws and, therefore, defendant's use of the illegal proceeds
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to pay bills was insufficient to establish a violation of sections 76-10-1603(1) or (2) (R. 93)
(Addendum D). Defendant also argued that the illegal proceeds must be "invested somehow
towards furthering the [racketeering] scheme" (R.156: 7). At the same time, defendant
admitted that if he used the funds to "print out business cards" that would "arguably" satisfy
the racketeering requirements (id). As will be discussed more fully, the trial court properly
denied the motion to quash (R. 156: 3-9) (Addendum Q.
(A) Defendant Is Not Entitled To Raise Unpreserved Arguments.
On appeal, defendant impermissibly expands his argument beyond that preserved by
his conditional plea bargain. See Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, | 13 (recognizing that a
unconditional guilty plea waives all "nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea
constitutional violations"); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 1 l(i) (permitting the parties to enter into an
agreement conditioning a guilty plea on the right to appeal "the adverse ruling of any
specified pre-trial motion"). For the first time on appeal, defendant claims that sections 7610-1603( 1) & (2) require him to be a business entity or associated with other businesses and
requires proof that his illegal efforts required organization or assistancefromothers (Br.Aplt.
at 25-33). Defendant admits that the stipulated facts establish that he worked with two other
people when he made his misrepresentations to some victims, but asserts, for the first time,
that the stipulated facts do not adequately establish what this involvement was (Br.Aplt. at
29-32). Defendant also claims for the first time on appeal that racketeering requires proof
of a specific injury to the enterprise (Br.Aplt. at 33-34). These arguments were not raised
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below and are, therefore, waived.13 See Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, % 13.
(B) The Trial Court Properly Rejected Defendant's Limited Challenge.
To the extent defendant's argument below is preserved for appeal, his challenge is
limited by the procedural posture of his motion to quash. Defendant waived preliminary
hearing (R. 74; R.156: 6). The parties then stipulated to what the preliminary hearing

13

Even if defendant's appellate arguments were preserved and entitled to
consideration, the arguments are not properly supported. Here, the prosecutor abandoned
reliance on the third variation of the racketeering statute, section 76-10-1603(3), which
requires proof that the "person" was employed by or associated in fact with an enterprise
and conducted the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering (R. 1-11,
111). See Addendum A. Nevertheless, defendant cites as authority decisions interpreting
the third variation {BrAplt at 28-33). Those decisions provide no support for
interpreting subsections (1) & (2) because it is well-established that the requirements of
the first two subsections are not as stringent as those of subsection (3). See State v.
Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425,430-37 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing that subsection (3)
required more than the "one-man show" that was permissible under subsections (1) &
(2)); Haraco, Inc. v. American Nat Bank & Trust, 141 F.2d 384,401-402 (7th Cir. 1984)
(distinguishing similar requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)fromthose of section
1962(a)). But see Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 121 S. Ct. 2087,2091
(2001) (recognizing that previous interpretations of section 1962(c) were too stringent
and holding that a sole proprietor may be both the person and the enterprise under
subsection (c)).
Defendant also cites interpretations of what constitutes an "enterprise," without
acknowledging that those interpretations have been expressly rejected by Utah courts.
Compare, e.g., BrAplt. at 31-32 (citing 8th Circuit standard), with State v. McGrath, 749
P.2d 631, 634-37 (Utah 1988) (implicitly rejecting 8th Circuit standard; Hutchings, 950
P.2d at 432-33 (expressly rejecting 8th Circuit standard). Similarly, defendant imposes an
"injury in fact" requirement onto criminal racketeering {BrAplt at 33-34), without
acknowledging that such a requirement is only statutorily required in civil racketeering.
Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (criminal racketeering), with UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-10-1605 (1999) (providing civil remedy for injuries arising from racketeering)
{Addendum A).
Based on defendant's lack of preservation and briefing failures, this Court should
not consider defendant's appellate arguments raised for the first time on appeal.
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testimony would have been if witnesses had been called (R. 76-84) (Addendum B). Those
facts establish that defendant falsely held himself out to be the owner of or associated with
at least two existing mortgage companies, when in fact he had no association with the
companies and his appraiser's license had been revoked for priorfraudulentrepresentations
(R. 76-84) (Addendum B). Defendant sought out homeowners facing foreclosure and falsely
represented that he could obtain refinancing for them for a fee (id.). Defendant "worked
with" two other men, Brett Kennedy and William Thomas, who were present during some
of defendant's encounters with the victims and heard some of his misrepresentations (R. 82).
Defendant told Thomas to misrepresent himself as an appraiser to one of the victims (id.).
The facts further establish that defendant traveled throughout the Wasatch Front to solicit his
victims, including Provo, Tooele, West Jordan, South Jordan, Draper, Murray, and Salt Lake
City, and also contacted his victims by telephone (R. 76-82). At least once, defendant
provided a victim with a formal loan application (R. 78). Defendant took the $5000 plus he
obtained through his pattern of illegal activity and used the proceeds to pay "his personal
bills" (R. 84). Although the stipulated facts do not otherwise specify how the monies were
deposited or what "personal" bills were paid, it is reasonable to assume that some of those
bills covered defendant's vehicle expenses in traveling and telephone expenses in contacting
the various victims. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, fj 10 & 20,20 P.3d 300 (acknowledging
that evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution in ruling on a
motion to quash).
Based on these limited facts, defendant moved to quash the racketeering charge. But
24
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as the trial court properly noted, defendant waived the preliminary hearing (R. 74; R. 156: 6).
Consequently, defendant could not attack the factual sufficiency of the stipulated facts, but
only their legal significance. In other words, defendant was only entitled to pretrial dismissal
of the racketeering charge if, as a matter of law, the use of funds to pay personal bills could
never satisfy the requirements of sections 76-10-1603(1) or (2). Cf. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 10
(recognizing that in determining probable cause for bindover, all reasonable inferences are
resolved in favor of the prosecution and resolution of conflicting evidence is left to the factfinder at trial).
The trial court rightfully rejected defendant's legal challenge. The court correctly
ruled that racketeering requires a "series of crimes" (a pattern of unlawful activity) and "then
doing something with the gains from the criminal activity" (use or invest) (R.156: 5)
{Addendum Q. Accord Hutchings, 950 P.2d at 431. That use does not require proof that
the illegal funds went "somewhere else other than the individual defendant" and does not
require proof that the use of the proceeds actually furthered the scheme (R. 156: 5 & 7).
Instead, liability may be predicated on defendant's use of the proceeds for his own benefit
(R. 156: 7). Accord id. at 433 (holding that for purposes of section 76-10-1603( 1), the person
and the enterprise may be the "same entity . . . as long as the 'person' is 'actually the direct
beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity'") (quoting Garbade v. Great Divide
Mining and Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212, 213 (10th Cir. 1987)).
Moreover, the trial court correctly refused to address the ultimate sufficiency of the
facts to support a racketeering conviction because, where defendant waived preliminary
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hearing, the prosecutor was entitled to make her evidentiary showing at trial (R. 156: 6). Cf.
Clark, 2001 UT 9, J 10 (recognizing that "the evidence required to show probable cause is
relatively low because the assumption is that the prosecution's case will only get stronger as
the investigation continues" and trial ensues).
In sum, while more evidence might be required for conviction, alleging that defendant,
as the principal and the enterprise, used the illegal funds to pay personal bills was sufficient
to avoid pretrial dismissal of the racketeering charge.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the denial of defendant's motion to reduce and/or quash and,
thereby, defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ / ^ ) j a y of August, 2002.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF

CHRISTINE F.SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General

i
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76-6-412, Theft — Classification of offenses — Action
for treble damages.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this
chapter shall be punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds
$5,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable
motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as
defined in Section 76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if:
(i) the value of the property or services is or
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of
theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to
commit theft; or
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree
felony, the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt,
gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat,
mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing
animal raised for commercial purposes;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property
stolen is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen is less than $300.
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or commits theft of property described in
Subsection 76-6-412(lXbXiii), is civilly liable for three times
the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
1997
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76-6-501. Forgery —-Writing* defined.
( D A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating afraudto be
perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority
or utters any such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues,
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purporta to be the act of another, whether the person is
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no
such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing,
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of
recording valuable information including forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right,
privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument
or writing issued by a government or any agency, or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other
instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim
against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim
against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
ises
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76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance act — Punishment as for theft.
( D A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that
person with intent to defraud:
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or
written statement or representation knowing that the
statement or representation contains false or fraudulent
information concerning any fact material to an application for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy,
certificate, or contract;
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or
written statement or representation as part of or in
support of a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant
to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, or in
connection with any civil claim asserted for recovery of
damages for personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the statement or representation contains false or fraudulent information concerning any fact
or thing material to the claim;
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from proceeds derived
from a fraudulent insurance act;
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a
scheme or artifice to obtain fees for professional services,
or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (lXa) is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsections (1Kb) through (IXd), is
punishable as in the manner prescribed by Section 76-101801 for communication fraud for property of like value.
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of
insurance fraud under the same conditions as those set forth
in Section 76-2-204.
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under
Subsections (1Kb) through (IXd) shall be measured by the
total value of all property, money, or other things obtained or
sought to be obtained by the fraudulent insurance act or acts
described in Subsections (1Kb) through (IXd).
ist4
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-1602. Definitions.
<n) sexual exploitation of a minor. Section 76-5a-3.
used in this part:
(o) arson or aggravated arson, Sections 76-6-102
(1) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorand 76-6-103;
lip, partnership, corporation, business trust, associa(p) causing a catastrophe, Section 76-6-105;
on, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
(q) burglary or aggravated burglary, Sections 76-6idivtduals associated in fact although not a legal entity,
202 and 76-6-203;
fid includes illicit as well as licit entities.
(r) burglary of a vehicle, Section 76-6-204;
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity* means engaging in
(s) manufacture or possession of an instrument for
mduct which constitutes the commission of at least three
burglary or theft, Section 76-6-205;
Disodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not
(t) robbery or aggravated robbery, Sections 76-6olated, but have the same or similar purposes, results,
301 and 76-6-302;
surticipants, victims, or methods of commission, or other(u) theft, Section 76-6-404;
ise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics,
(v) theft by deception, Section 76-6-405;
iken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continu(w) theft by extortion. Section 76-6-406;
ig unlawful conduct and be related either to each other
(x) receiving stolen property, Section 76-6-408;
' to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes compris(y) theft of services, Section 76-6-409;
ig a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred
(z) forgery, Section 76-6-501;
\er July 31, 1981. The most recent act constituting part
(aa)
fraudulent use of a credit card, Sections 76-6' a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this part
506.1,
76-6-506.2,
and 76-6-506.4;
lall have occurred within five years of the commission of
(bb) deceptive business practices, Section 76-6te next preceding act alleged as part of the pattern.
507;
(3) "Person* includes any individual or entity capable of
(cc) bribery or receiving bribe by person in the
>lding a legal or beneficial interest in property, including
business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of goods,
ate, county, and local governmental entities.
Section 76-6-508;
(4) "Unlawful activity* means to directly engage in
(dd) bribery of a labor official. Section 76-6-509;
induct or to solicit, request, command, encourage, or
(ee) defrauding creditors. Section 76-6-511;
tentionally aid another person to engage in conduct
(ff) acceptance of deposit by insolvent financial
hich would constitute any offense described by the
institution, Section 76-6*512;
iiowing crimes or categories of crimes, or to attempt or
(gg) unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary,
nspire to engage in an act which would constitute any of
Section 76-6-513;
iose offenses, regardless of whether the act is in fact
(hh) bribery or threat to influence contest. Section
targed or indicted by any authority or is classified as a
76-6-514;
isdemeanor or a felony:
(ii) making a false credit report, Section 76-6-517;
(a) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of
(jj) criminal simulation, Section 76-6-518;
Title 13, Chapter 10, Unauthorized Recording Prac(kk) criminal usury, Section 76-6-520;
tices Act;
(11) false or fraudulent insurance claim, Section
(b) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of
76-6-521;
Title 19, Environmental Quality Code, Sections 19-1(mm) computer crimes, Section 76-6-703;
101 through 19-7-109;
(nn) sale of a child, Section 76-7-203;
(c) taking, destroying, or possessing wildlife or
(oo) bribery to influence official or political actions.
parts of wildlife for the primary purpose of sale,
Section 76-8-103;
trade, or other pecuniary gain, in violation of Title 23,
(pp) threats to influence official or political action,
Chapter 13, Wildlife Resources Code of Utah, or
Section 76-8-104;
Section 23-20-4;
(qq) receiving bribe or bribery by public servant,
(d) false claims for medical benefits, kickbacks,
Section 76-8-105;
and any other act prohibited by False Claims Act,
(rr) receiving bribe or bribery for endorsement of
Sections 26-20-1 through 26-20-12;
person as public servant, Section 76-8-106;
(e) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of
(ss) official misconduct, Sections 76-8-201 and 76Title 32A, Chapter 12, Criminal Offenses;
8-202;
(f) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of
(tt) obstruction of justice, Section 76-8-306;
Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Land Sales Prac(uu) acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent
tices Act;
tg) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of
criminal prosecution, Section 76-6-308;
Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances
(w) false or inconsistent material statements, SecAct, or Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled
tion 76-8-502;
Substances Act, or Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Con(ww) false or inconsistent statements, Section 76trolled Substance Precursor Act;
8-503;
(h) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of
(xx) written false statements, Section 76-8-504;
Title 61, Chapter 1, Utah Uniform Securities Act;
(yy) tampering with a witness, retaliation against
(i) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of
a witness or informant, or bribery, Section 76-8-508;
Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code;
(zz) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal pro(j) assault or aggravated assault, Sections 76-5ceeding, Section 76-8-509;
102 and 76-5-103;
(aaa) public assistance fraud in violation of Section
(k) a threat against life or property, Section 76-576-8-1203, 76-8-1204, or 76-8-1205;
107;
(bbb) intentionally or knowingly causing one ani(1) criminal homicide, Sections
76-5-201,
76-5-202,
malJ. to
fightClark
withLaw
another,
Subsection 76-9-30KIMf);
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and 76-5-203;
(ccc)
possession,
use, or removal of explosives,
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errors.
(m) kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, Secchemical, or incendiary devices or parts, Section

add delivery to common earner, mailing, or
placement on premises of an incendiary device, Section 76-10-307,
(eee) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to
assault, Section 76-10-507;
(AT) unlawful marking of pistol or revolver, Section
76-10-521;
(ggg) alteration of number or mark on pistol or
revolver, Section 76-10-522;
(hhh) forging or counterfeiting trademarks, trade
name, or trade device, Section 76-10-1002;
(iii) selling goods under counterfeited trademark,
trade name, or trade devices, Section 76-10-1003;
(jij) sales in containers bearing registered trademark of substituted articles, Section 76-10-1004;
(kkk) selling or dealing with article bearing registered trademark or service mark with intent to defraud, Section 76-10-1006;
(111) gambling, Section 76-10-1102;
(mmm) gambling fraud, Section 76-10-1103;
(nnn) gambling promotion. Section 76-10-1104;
(ooo) possessing a gambling device or record, Section 76-10-1105;
(ppp) confidence game, Section 76-10-1109;
(qqq) distributing pornographic material, Section
76-10-1204;
(rrr) inducing acceptance of pornographic material, Section 76-10-1205;
(sss) dealing in harmful material to a minor, Section 76-10-1206;
(ttt) distribution of pornographic films, Section 7610-1222;
(uuu) indecent public displays, Section 76-101228;
(wv) prostitution, Section 76-10-1302;
(www) aiding prostitution, Section 76-10-1304;
(xxx) exploiting prostitution, Section 76-10-1305;
(yyy) aggravated exploitation of prostitution, Section 76-10-1306;
(Hz) communications fraud. Section 76-10-1801;
(aaaa) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency Transaction Reporting Act;
(bbbb) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of the laws governing taxation in this state; and
(cccc) any act illegal under the laws of the United
States and enumerated in Title 18, Section 1961
(1KB), (C), and (D) of the United States Code.
76-10-1603. Unlawful acta.
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any
proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the person has participated
as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part
of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds
derived from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of
unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of unlawful activity.
<4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any
provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3).
IN?

76-10-1603.5. Violation a felony — Costa — Forfeiture
— Fines — Divestiture — Restrictions — Dissolution or reorganization — Restraining orders and injunctions — Hearings — Special
verdict — Findings — Judgment and order of
forfeiture — Seizure of property — Sale —
Proceeds — Petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture — Hearing — Disposition.
(1) A person who violates any provision of Section 76-101603 is guilty of a second degree felony. In addition to
penalties prescribed by law, the court may order the person
found guilty of the felony to pay to the state, if the attorney
general brought the action, or to the county, if the county
attorney or district attorney brought the action, the costs of
investigating and prosecuting the offense and the costs of
securing the forfeitures provided for in this section. The
person shall forfeit to the Uniform School Fund, Title 53A,
Chapter 16, Section 101, of the Utah Code:
(a) any interest acquired or maintained in violation of
any provision of Section 76-10-1603;
(b) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated m
the conduct of in violation of Section 76-10-1603; and
(c) any property constituting or derived from the net
proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly.
from the conduct constituting the pattern of unlawful
activity or from any act or conduct constituting the
pattern of unlawful activity proven as part of the violation
of any provision of Section 76-10-1603.
(2) If a violation of Section 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern
of unlawful activity consisting of acts or conduct in violation of
Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222.
the property subject to forfeiture under this section is limited
to property, the seizure or forfeiture of which would not
constitute a prior restraint on the exercise of an affected
party's rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States or Article I, Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution, or would not otherwise unlawfully interfere with the
exercise of thoee rights.
(3) In lieu of a line otherwise authorized by law for a
violation of Section 76-10-1603, a defendant who derives net
proceeds from a conduct prohibited by Section 76-10-1603.
may be fined not more than twice the amount of the net
proceeds.
(4) Property subject to criminal forfeiture in accord with the
procedures and substantive protections of the Utah Uniform
Forfeiture Procedures Act Title 24, Chapter 1, of the Utah
Code includes:
(a) real property, including things growing on, affixed
to, and found in land; and
(b) tangible and intangible personal property including
money, rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities
of any kind;
(c) but does not include property exchanged or to be
exchanged for services rendered in connection with the
defense of the charges or any related criminal case
(5) Upon conviction for violating any provision of Section
76-10-1603, and in addition to any penalty prescribed by law
and in addition to any forfeitures provided for in this section.
the court may do any or all of the following:
(a) order the person to divest himself of any interest in
or any control, direct or indirect, of any enterprise;
(b) impose reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including prohiomng
the person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as
the enterprise engaged in, to the extent the Utah Cmn.-
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:ut:on and tne Constitution of the United States permit;
)r
<a order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
If a violation of Section 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern
lawful activity consisting of acts or conduct in violation of
on 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222,
:ourt may not enter any order that would amount to a
restraint on the exercise of an affected party's rights
r the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
ss or Article I, Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution.
All rights, title, and interest in forfeitable property
ribed in Subsections (1) and (2) vest in the state treasurer,
>half of the Uniform School Fund, upon the commission of
ict or conduct giving rise to the forfeiture under this
on.
For purposes of this section, the "net proceeds* of an
se means property acquired as a result of the violation
is the direct costs of acquiring the property.
3-10O4. Enforcement authority of peace officers.
^withstanding any law to the contrary, peace officers in
itate of Utah shall have authority to enforce the criminal
isions of this act by initiating investigations, assisting
d junes, obtaining indictments, filing informations, and
iting in the prosecution of criminal cases through the
k
ney general or county attorneys' offices.
itei
0* 1006. Remedies of person injured by a pattern of
unlawful activity — Double damages — Costa,
including attorney's fee — Arbitration —
Agency — Burden of proof—Actions by attorney general, county attorney, or district attorney — Dismissal — Statute of limitations —
Authorised orders of district court.
) A person injured in his person, business, or property by
rson engaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of
ion 76-10-1603 may sue in an appropriate district court
recover twice the damages he sustains, regardless of
ther:
(a) the injury is separate or distinct from the injury
suffered as a result of the acts or conduct constituting the
pattern of unlawful conduct alleged as part of the cause of
action; or
(b) the conduct has been adjudged criminal by any
court of the state or of the United States.
) A party who prevails on a cause of action brought under
section recovers the cost of the suit, including a reasonattorney's fee.
) All actions arising under this section which are
mded in fraud are subject to arbitration under Title 78,
pter 31a.
) In all actions under this section, a principal is liable for
lal damages for harm caused by an agent acting within the
>e of either his employment or apparent authority. A
icipal is liable for double damages only if the pattern of
iwful activity alleged and proven as part of the cause of
on was authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, untaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of
>ctors or a high managerial agent acting within the scope of
employment.
j) In all actions arising under this section, the burden of
}f is clear and convincing evidence.
>) The attorney general, county attorney, or, if within a
secution district, the district attorney may maintain acts under this section on behalf of the state, the county, or
person injured by a person engaged in conduct forbidden
iny provision of Section 76-10-1603, to prevent, restrain, or
ledy injury as defined in this section and may recover the
nages and costs allowed by this section.

17^ In all actions under this section, the elements o( -jcr.
claim or cause of action shall be stated with particularity
against each defendant.
(8) If an action, claim, or counterclaim brought or asserted
by a private party under this section is dismissed prior to trial
or disposed of on summary judgment, or if it is determined at
trial that there is no liability, the prevailing party shall
recover from the party who brought the action or asserted the
claim or counterclaim the amount of its reasonable expenses
incurred because of the defense against the action, claim, or
counterclaim, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(9) An action or proceeding brought under this section shall
be commenced within three years after the conduct prohibited
by Section 76-10-1603 terminates or the cause of action
accrues, whichever is later. This provision supersedes any
limitation to the contrary.
(10) (a) In any action brought under this section, the district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain, or remedy
injury as defined by this section by issuing appropriate
orders after making provisions for the rights of innocent
persons.
(b) Before liability is determined in any action brought
under this section, the district court may:
(i) issue restraining orders and injunctions;
(ii) require satisfactory performance bonds or any
other bond it considers appropriate and necessary in
connection with any property or any requirement
imposed upon a party by the court; and
(iii) enter any other order the court considers necessary and proper.
(c) After a determination of liability, the district court
may, in addition to granting the relief allowed in Subsection (1), do any one or all of the following:
(i) order any person to divest himself of any interest in or any control, direct or indirect, of any enterprise;
(ii) impose reasonable restrictions on the future
activities or investments of any person, including
prohibiting any person from engaging in the same
type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, to the
extent the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of
the United States permit; or
(iii) order the dissolution or reorganization of any
enterprise.
(d) However, if an action is brought to obtain any relief
provided by this section, and if the conduct prohibited by
Section 76-10-1603 has for its pattern of unlawful activity
acts or conduct illegal under Section 76-10-1204, 76-101205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court may not enter
any order that would amount to a prior restraint on the
exercise of an affected party's rights under the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or
Article I, Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution. The court shall,
upon the request of any affected party, and upon the
notice to all parties, prior to the issuance of any order
provided for in this subsection, and at any later time, hold
hearings as necessary to determine whether any materials at issue are obscene or pornographic and to determine
if there is probable cause to believe that any act or
conduct alleged violates Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205,
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222. In making its findings the
court shall be guided by the same considerations required
of a court making similar findings in criminal cases
brought under Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-101206, or 76-10-1222, including, but not limited to, the
definitions in Sections 76-10-1201, 76-10-1203, and 76-101216, and the exemptions in Section 76-10-1226.
isw
76-10-1606. Repealed.
i»*

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penalties.
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme
or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property,
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is
or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the
scheme or artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of
something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under
Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value of all
property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by
the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as
provided in Subsection (lXe).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary
element of the offense described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense
described in Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person
of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary element
of the offense.
(5) Each separata communication made for the purpose of
executing or concealing a scheme or artifice described in
Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication
fraud.
(6) (a) lb communicate as described in Subsection (1)
means to bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to
give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit
information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written
communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless
the pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted intentionally,
knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
IIM
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AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
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CHARLENE BARLOW, Bar No. 0212
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666
Utah Attorney General
5272 South College Drive, Suite 300
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 284-6343
Attorneys for Plaintiff

rN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
MURRAY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATED TESTIMONY
FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING

v.
BROOKS BRADSHAW,
Defendant.

Case No. 001200833 FS
Judge Michael K. Burton

For purpose of preliminary hearing only, the parties stipulate and agree that, if
called to testify at preliminary hearing, the following people would testify as follows:
JEFF AHLSTROM
In April 2000, Brooks Bradshaw met with Mr. Ahlstrom at 629 East 2875 North,
Provo, Utah. Mr. Ahlstrom was attempting to refinance his residence, and Mr. Bradshaw
represented himself to be a co-owner of Classic Mortgage, and purported to have financial
interest in numerous other mortgage companies including In-Time Funding. Mr. Bradshaw told
Mr. Ahlstrom that for a fee, $500 00, he would complete the title search, credit check and other
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necessary documentation to secure Mr. Ahlstrom's refinancing. Mr. Ahlstrom gave Mr.
Bradshaw $500.00, and Mr Bradshaw did not complete what he told Mr. Ahlstrom he would.
DENNY MOORE
On April 4, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Mr. Moore at 9049 South Kenyon
Circle, West Jordan, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw introduced himself and told Mr. Moore he was the
owner of Classic Mortgage in St. George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. Moore that he could
refinance or restructure his present mortgage. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. Moore that he would have
to pay Mr. Bradshaw $450 00 for a title search and credit report. Mr. Moore presented Mr.
Bradshaw $450.00 in cash and requested a receipt. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he would prepare a
receipt and get it to him. Mr. Moore would testify that no receipt has ever been given to him, and
no credit report or title search has been completed. Mr. Moore attempted to contact Mr.
Bradshaw, but learned that all the contact numbers Mr. Bradshaw had given him had been
changed.
HALBERT GRIBBLE
On May 5, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Mr. Gribble at 820 East Scott Avenue,
Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself to Mr. Gribble as the owner of Classic
Mortgage, in St. George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw informed Mr. Gribble that he was aware that Mr
Gribble was in the middle of a foreclosure process on his residence. Mr. Bradshaw represented to
Mr. Gribble that for a fee of $500.00, Mr. Bradshaw would provide a title search and appraisal on
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Mr. Gribble's property and assist him with refinancing. Mr. Gribble gave Mr. Bradshaw $500 00,
and has not heard from Mr. Bradshaw since.
ELIZABETH AND KEITH FITZGERALD
On March 3, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Brett Kennedy met with Elizabeth and
Keith Fitzgerald at 9527 South Caledona Circle, South Jordan, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented
himself as the owner of Classic Mortgage in St. George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he could
refinance the Fitzgeralds' residence in Mr. Bradshaw's name through a Quit Claim Deed, and in
two years he would deed it back to the Fitzgeralds. Mr. Bradshaw indicated to Elizabeth
Fitzgerald that he had access to plenty of money and that he could also purchase their store Mr.
Bradshaw stated that if he decided not to purchase the store, he knew other individuals who
would be interested. Mr. Bradshaw presented Mrs Fitzgerald with a loan application and stated
he would require $450.00 to pay for the credit check and appraisal. Mrs. Fitzgerald informed Mr.
Bradshaw that she had the residence appraised in November 1999, but the appraisal was not high
enough to refinance. Mr. Bradshaw told Mrs. Fitzgerald that that would not be a problem, he
would get an appraisal high enough. Mrs. Fitzgerald gave Mr. Bradshaw $450.00, and Mr.
Bradshaw has not contacted or delivered anything he represented he would accomplish.
RICHARD BRIMLEY
On April 15, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Richard Brimley at 5168 South
Cottonwood Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the co-owner of
Classic Mortgage and stated that he had brokered loans with several mortgage companies. Mr
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Brimley would testify that he informed Mr Bradshaw in detail about the real estate project he was
attempting to complete and thefinancinghe would require. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr Brimley that
for $500.00 he would complete an appraisal, title search and credit check. Mr. Brimley gave Mr.
Bradshaw a check for $500.00, made out to Mr. Bradshaw, because Mr. Bradshaw stated that he
wasn't sure which appraiser he would use. Mr. Brimley would testify that after Mr. Bradshaw
took the check and cashed it, Mr. Bradshaw has not made contact with him; Mr. Brimley also has
been unable to contact Mr. Bradshaw.
MAURICE AND LOUISE OHUMUKINI
On April 17, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Maurice and Louise Ohumukini, at
1160 East 800 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of
Classic Mortgage, in St. George, Utah. Mrs. Ohumukini would testify that Mr. Bradshaw told
her that with his financial contacts and resources he would assist her in refinancing some property
she and her husband owned. Mr. Bradshaw told her that for $500.00 he would arrange for an
appraisal on the property, and complete the necessary title search and credit check for refinancing.
Mrs. Ohumukini gave Mr. Bradshaw a check for $500.00 for the stated work to be performed.
Mrs. Ohumukini has not heard from Mr. Bradshaw since April, and none of the represented work
has been completed.
KAREN BUSH
On June 5, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Karen Bush by telephone. Karen
Bush's residence at 613 Blueridge Drive, Tooele, Utah was in foreclosure. Mr. Bradshaw
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indicated to Karen that he was interested in refinancing the residence in order to help her. On
June 11, 2000 Mr Bradshaw met with Karen Bush and her husband, at 613 Blueridge Drive,
Tooele, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw told Karen that he uses his own money to refinance and that a title
search and appraisal would be necessary to complete the refinancing. Mr. Bradshaw stated the
cost was $600.00, which would include $400.00 for the appraisal; $100.00 for the title search,
and his fee of $100 00. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he would accomplish the transaction by June
29, 2000, the date of the foreclosure in the Tooele County Court. Karen Bush never heard from
Mr Bradshaw, and she contacted the Tooele City Police Department. Detective Shawn Gleed
contacted Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Bradshaw told Detective Gleed he would refund the $600.00.
Karen Bush has not had contact with Mr. Bradshaw, and no refund has been made.
MIKE AND HOLLY CURTIS
In June 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Mike and Holly Curtis at 6587 South
Alfred Way, Murray, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. and Mrs. Curtis that he owned a mortgage
company, and used a title company to facilitate all his refinancing transactions. Mr. Bradshaw
gave the Curtises a loan application form, indicating that it would grant him permission to
perform a credit check and title search necessary to complete the refinancing. Mr. Bradshaw told
Mr and Mrs. Curtis that the cost would be $500.00. Holly Curtis would testify that they gave
Mr. Bradshaw a check for $500.00, hesitantly. After they had not heardfromMr. Bradshaw they
attempted to contact him, with no success. Mrs. Curtis and her husband, in approximately August
2000, saw Mr. Bradshaw at a local gas station and requested their money back. Mr. Bradshaw
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told them he would get it to them within the next couple of days. Mrs. Curtis would testify that
they have received no contact from Mr. Bradshaw.
CLIFF HARRIS
On 13, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Cliff Harris at 12109 South Samson Circle,
Draper, Utah. Mr. Harris was having somefinancialdifficulties and was in the process of
refinancing his residence. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of Classic Mortgage
and stated that for $500.00 he would arrange an appraisal, credit check and title search to
facilitate the refinance. Mr. Bradshaw indicated that there would be no problem in getting an
appraisal high enough to sufficiently cover the refinancing. Mr. Harris gave Mr. Bradshaw
$500 00 to perform the agreed work. Mr. Harris has had no contact with Mr. Bradshaw since
giving him the money.
HOLLY ANDERSON
On April 7, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Holly Anderson at 5997 South 200
East, Murray, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of Classic Mortgage, in St.
George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw stated to Holly Anderson that he had the capabilities and contacts
to assist her with refinancing her residence. Mr. Bradshaw told Holly Anderson that for $400.00
he would complete a credit check and title search necessary to secure her refinancing. Holly
Anderson gave Mr. Bradshaw $400.00 for the agreed work to be accomplished and has received
nothing since the transaction.
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MARLON ANDERSON
On April 14, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Marlon Anderson at 9838 South
TeeBox Drive, South Jordan, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of a
mortgage company. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he could assist Mr. Anderson with refinancing his
property for a fee of $500.00. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. Anderson that for the $500.00 he would
arrange an appraisal, perform a credit check and complete a title search, all necessary to arrange
the refinancing. Mr. Anderson gave Mr. Bradshaw $500 00 to complete the agreed work. Mr.
Anderson has never received any of the promised work and has been unable to contact Mr.
Bradshaw.
BRETT KENNEDY
Mr. Kennedy would testify that he used to work with the Mr. Bradshaw and he
witnessed some of the statements and promises made by Mr. Bradshaw to the individuals listed
above.
WILLIAM (BILL) THOMAS
Mr. Thomas would testify that he used to work with Mr. Bradshaw and that he
witnessed some of the statements and promises listed above. Mr. Thomas would also testify that
Mr Bradshaw told him to falsely represent himself as an appraiser to JefF Ahlstrom.
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JOHN HEMPHILL
Mr. Hemphill would testify that he is the owner of In-Time Funding. Mr. Hemphill
knew Mr. Bradshaw but the representations by Mr. Bradshaw to other individuals that the
defendant was a part owner of In-Time Funding were false.
TERRISON SPINKS
Mr. Spinks is the owner of Classic Mortgage. He knew the Mr Bradshaw but the
representations by Mr. Bradshaw to other individuals that the Mr. Bradshaw was a part owner of
Classic Mortgage were not true.
JON BROWN
Mr. Brown, Lead Investigator for the Division of Real Estate, Department of
Commerce, would testify that Mr. Bradshaw had received a NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
DEFAULT before the Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification Board in 1998 The
defendant Brooks Bradshaw had a pattern of inflating property values for the purpose of
defrauding by means of false orfraudulentpretenses. The Defendant Brooks Bradshaw had his
license to act as a state registered appraiser revoked in 1998.
JEFF WRIGHT
Mr. Wright would testify that he is an investigator with the Utah Attorney
General's Office. Mr. Wright interviewed Mr. Bradshaw at which time Mr. Bradshaw admitted
that he had met with the individuals listed above and in the affidavit of probable causefiledwith
this case and received moneyfromthem in return for the promises that he made to help them
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refinance their properties. Mr. Bradshaw admitted to Investigator Wright that he used the money
to pay his personal bills. Mr. Bradshaw provided Investigator Wright with a list of individuals
from whom he had taken money. Investigator Wright compared and confirmed the list with
information obtained in the course of the investigation and it proved to be accurate.
DATED this ^ ~ day of May, 2001.

Robert K. Heineman
Attorney for defendant

Charlene Barlow
Assistant Attorney General
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2001, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing
before the HONORABLE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., sitting as
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P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:
(Off t h e

Good morning.

record.)

THE COURT:

And Mr. Heineman with the defendant are

present.
The matter was set on this calendar for the purpose
of scheduling and the decision that I would make in relation
to the defendant's motion, which was a motion to quash the
bind over and reduce the degree of the offenses charged and
also to—and that was in relation to the counts of
communication fraud and also to quash the count of
racketeering•
And then I suppose in relation to my—well, and then
to schedule the matter because regardless of my determination
here, there would still be a matter that would need a setting-well, I suppose if I quashed, that would send back the matter
to be—for a preliminary hearing and so it's a matter of
scheduling either a trial or sending it back for a further
preliminary hearing and—and setting that preliminary hearing.
So, that's the scheduling, I think, that's anticipated, one of
those two.
And I've considered at some length here, the—the
motion that's made and I've heard argument on the matter and—
and also in connection with the matter, there had been a
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waiver of the preliminary hearing for the set of facts
entitled Stipulated Testimony for Preliminary Hearing that had
been submitted as a factual basis in terms of my consideration
of the motions that I've just indicated.
The first motion is to quash the bind over in
connection with the counts of communication fraud.

I won't—I

won't rehash, if you will, the arguments and the various
considerations.

It seems to me that the argument basically

hinged on how one would interpret the word "another" as to
whether that was plural or singular and whether the term
"scheme" as used in the statute, was restricted in some way
to—to each victim.
That seemed to be the thrust of the argument, so
consequently aggregating various—the—-the amounts obtained or
sough to be obtained from various victims would not be the
statutory scheme, if you will, a scheme within a scheme, the
statutory approach to communications fraud.
But it appears to me that the word "another" can and
is—can and is defined in the plural and basically, I come to
that conclusion because the statute is very specific in
aggregation of damages; in other words, the statute seems to
add to the definition that draws the conclusion for me that
"another", the term "another" can be plural.
The term "scheme" however, is singular but it's not
singular in terms of victims; in other words, it's not one
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victim, one scheme.

I think the statutory approach here is

that we aggregate within the scheme to determine the degree of
the offense of each communication.

The way the State has

charged this is, rather than a—one communication, one count,
they have one victim, one count, although the allegation is
that one has communicated with this victim.
So, the way they've chosen to do this, although I
can see the possibility of taking each communication with one
victim and breaking that out to one count, I don't see that
this is a question of double jeopardy, because what the
statute seeks to punish is different communications, is
individual communications.

So, that's the conduct and of

course, this presumes—I've taken the facts as being able to
be proved by the State.
They do have to show, the State does have to show
that there is a scheme here, but that's not necessarily under
the statute restricted to one victim.

I—that's my conclusion

on that.
I don't think this is a Shondell situation because
as I say, this is—this is not a theft and a theft.

The

Shondell situation would be—or the Shondell rule, I should
say, would be, if I have one set of conduct that's punishable
under two statutes, then I'd pick the statute that has the
least penalty, has the lesser penalty.
But the conduct that's being punished here is not
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the theft,

it is the communication in a scheme to defraud.

That's a different—that's not a theft, that's communication
fraud and not a Shondell situation.
In terms of the racketeering, that—that's—the
argument there seemed to hinge on, seemed to focus—well, on
whether an individual is the one one invests in and so forth.
The statute permits that. What racketeering seems to be under
the statute is that I engage in a certain defined category of
conduct, which is a series of offenses. And then, that
qualifies then for the racketeering, but then I must do
something with the—the gains from that criminal activity.
And the argument, the defense argument seems to me
that there's, quite frankly, no showing, I suppose, what—as
to what happened to this—the ill-gotten gains; but that's a
matter of proof that we don't have as yet.
So, the only issue that I'm called upon at this
point, I suppose, to determine is to whether the State must
show that your investment or your—where these—where these
illegally obtained proceeds went was somewhere else other than
the individual defendant.

And it appears to me that the

statute does anticipate that if you use for yourself the—the-the gains, then you are in violation of the racketeering if
the predicate is also proven, that is a series of criminal
activity.
What I don't have in the stipulated facts is where
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these ill-gotten gains—how they were used.

But that is not

to say, because there was a waiver of the preliminary hearing,
that the State is not to be given an opportunity to make that
necessary showing*
Now, I don't know what was anticipated under that
kind of a circumstance.
this:

I guess what I'm indicating to you is

You've waived the preliminary hearing, reserving these

arguments and giving me a set of facts upon which to determine
these arguments, but I find the stipulated testimony
inadequate on this one issue, in terms of the use of the illgotten gains.
Now, I don't know what was anticipated.

Whether a

preliminary hearing to focus in on those non-existent facts or
if there was non-existent facts, that because there was a
waiver, waived the preliminary hearing.
MR. HEINEMAN:

I think what we were contemplating

was—
THE COURT:

Am I—am I—have I confused—have I

confused the situation?
MR. HEINEMAN:

Well, perhaps we confused it by

calling it a waiver because perhaps more of what it was was a
bind over upon stipulated facts rather than a—a waiver in the
typical sense of a waiver.

We're not doing anything at all

here at this particular hearing.
THE COURT:

Well, I can—yeah, and as I say, I
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understand the argument, but it seems to hinge on how—how—
how were the gains used and indeed, there has to be a showing,
although it may be that he used the gains himself, which I
would determine to be sufficient under the statute, but
there's nothing in the facts, I suppose other than the
implication, I don't—as I went through the facts, I didn't—
there was no fact presented to me regarding how the proceeds
were to be used or were used.
MR. HEINEMAN:

And I guess my argument on that point

was a little more specific.

It's my contention that in order

to meet the elements of that statute, they have to show it was
invested somehow towards furthering the scheme; so him using
the proceeds for himself, to buy himself some Star Bucks
Coffee or take himself to the movie or put gas in his car for
whatever purpose, wouldn't meet that.

If he uses the proceeds

to print out business cards to help further his communication
fraud scheme, arguably, that would.
And that's how I was seeing that particular
distinction and I don't believe the State has any evidence
that these were used for anything other than him and his just
normal living expenses.
THE COURT:

Well, and that's what I'm—I'm finding,

that I respectfully disagree; that using the proceeds for
himself, if you will, or not towards furthering the scheme
does qualify under that element in the racketeering.
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What I didn't have in the facts and I apologize if I
just misread them, but there was nothing that indicated one
way or the other how it was used.

There is an element that

must show that the proceeds were used, consequently, I suppose
if you had a circumstance where I got some money from somebody
and didn't use it at all, I held it, that that may b e —
although I'm not going to decide that today, but that may well
be a circumstance in which one of the essential elements of
racketeering has not been met, but because the facts didn't
take it that one more step as to how the—how it was used at
all, then I didn't know whether—well, like I say, that's my
determination.

But whether you anticipated a need here, other

than through trial but at preliminary hearing to get into that
other element, that is how the proceeds were used, I—I didn't
know that.

That's why I leave that question open.

MS. BARLOW:

Your Honor, I did want to point out on

Page 9, Mr. Bradshaw admitted to Investigator Wright that he
used the money to pay his personal bills.

That's the only

thing that we put into the stipulated facts.
THE COURT:
MS. BARLOW:

It's—

Well, maybe I didn't see that then.
Well, and it is just one sentence. I

can see how the Court might—
THE COURT:
MS. BARLOW:
THE COURT:

Right at the end.
Yeah.

Right.

Well, that may be suffi~I don't—
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MS. BARLOW:
THE COURT:

I don't know that it matters, you know.
Well, it doesn't.

That's exactly the

sort of thing, I suppose, that I was looking for in terms of
how they were used, because the argument is, How are they
used?

And if that statement—and I didn't—I didn't pick up

on that last sentence, I suppose.

If that statement is a—a

statement intended to go to the proceeds, then I suppose that
answers my question and there's nothing further, but I—I
mean, in terms of further testimony by way of a preliminary
hearing to—to determine that issue.
Mr. Heineman, your comment on that?
MR. HEINEMAN:

Well, that is in the stipulation and

that's what all of us anticipated.

And frankly, even if it

weren't in there, there's probably a reasonable inference just
from the fact that he received these monies. Most people will
use money rather than stuff it in a mattress; but—
THE COURT:

Well, as I say, I don't—that's

certainly an essential element that the State is going to have
to prove and—
MR. HEINEMAN:
THE COURT:

But the legal issue a s —

But to—but to the legal issue as to

whether the proceeds must be used to further the scheme, as I
say, I respectfully disagree.
Consequently, your motion is denied and—and as I
say, I think that leaves us then with setting this matter for
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trial.
MR. HEINEMAN:

We'll probably have a—a disposition

with a conditional guilty plea is what I'm contemplating.
THE COURT:

Would you like to set this maybe for

some scheduling date o r —
MR. HEINEMAN:

Why don't we pick a disposition date

and i f —
THE COURT:

Disposition.

MR. HEINEMAN:

—further proceedings are needed

after that, we can schedule them at that time.
THE COURT:

If that's agreeable, then let's set it

for—I would put it on a law and motion calendar.

July 31st,

August 14th.
MR. HEINEMAN:
those dates.

I'm going to be out of town both

If we could do the 28th?

THE COURT:

28th of August at 9:00 o'clock.

Ms. Barlow?
MS. BARLOW:
THE COURT:

That's fine, your Honor.
Let's show then that date as a

disposition date and Mr. Bradshaw, we'd have a written notice
for you of that hearing.
Is there anything further to consider on this
matter?
MS. BARLOW:
THE COURT:

No.
Thank you.
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ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attorneys for Defendant
'
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

: MOTION AND MEMORANDUM TO QUASH
BINDOVER AND REDUCE THE DEGREE
: OF OFFENSE OF CHARGED COUNTS

Plaintiff,
v.

:

BROOKS BRADSHAW,

: Case No. 001200833FS
Honorable JOSEPH C. FRATTO

Defendant.
Defendant

BROOKS

BRADSHAW,

by

and

through counsel,

respectfully moves that this court quash bindover for racketeering
and reduce the degree of offense of the charged communications
fraud counts.
FACTS
The

parties

have

filed

a STIPULATED

TESTIMONY

FOR

PRELIMINARY HEARING which outlines the factual basis for the
State's charges.

In summary, Mr. Brooks is accused of defrauding

eleven persons of amounts ranging from $400 to $600 each, for a
total of $5,400.

He is charged and has been bound over on eleven

counts of communications fraud, second degree felonies, and a
twelfth count of racketeering, a second degree felony.
For reasons set forth in this memorandum, Mr. Brooks
contends that he should be charged with eleven separate counts of
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class A misdemeanor communications fraud or theft by deception, and
the racketeering count should be quashed.
ARGUMENT
A.
I.

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD COUNTS

STATUTORY SCHEME

Communications fraud is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1801:
§ 76-10-1801. Communications fraud--Elements--Penalties
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another
money, property, or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions, and who communicates directly or
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is
guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be
obtained is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of
the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of
the scheme or artifice to defraud is other than the
obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense
under Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value
of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to
be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in
Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (1)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a
necessary element of the offense described in Subsection
(1) ..
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any
offense described in Subsection (1) to permanently

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value
is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose
of executing or concealing a scheme or artifice described
in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of
communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1)
means to bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to
give by way of information;
to talk over;
or to
transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not
limited to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio,
television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written
communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section
unless the pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard
for the truth.
Emphasis added.
Subsection (2) provides that all amounts in a scheme are
aggregated
provides
interplay

to

that
of

determine
each
these

the

level

communication
two

of
is

subsections

offense.
a

Subsection

(5)

offense.

The

statutory

and

separate
violates

constitutional prohibitions, and this court should quash or reduce
the degree of the charged offenses accordingly.

II.

AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, THE
STATE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO AGGREGATE
AMOUNTS ACROSS DIFFERENT SCHEMES AND DIFFERENT
VICTIMS.

Subsection

(2)

of

the

communications

fraud

statute

defines the degree of offense by the total amount obtained "by the
scheme or artifice described in Subsection

(1)."

speaks of a scheme or artifice to defraud another.
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Subsection

(1)

Subsection (1)

does not speak of a scheme or artifice to defraud others, nor does
it speak at all of larger schemes involving more than one victim.
Mr. Bradshaw is alleged to have had eleven separate
schemes with eleven different victims.

Here, the State is using

the amount obtained in all eleven schemes to enhance the charge in
each scheme.

This it may not do.

If Mr. Bradshaw had obtained

different amounts on different occasions within a single scheme
with a single victim, those amounts could be aggregated to define
a higher level of offense; but nothing in the statute purports to
allow aggregation across different schemes. Reading the statute as
a whole, State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992) ("statutory
provisions should be construed to give full effect to all their
terms"), the offenses alleged here should have been charged as
eleven separate counts of class A misdemeanor communications fraud.

III.

THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE, AS INTERPRETED
AND USED BY THE STATE, RUNS AFOUL OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-1-402 (1)

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) provides in pertinent part
that "when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal
episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision."

As Mr. Brooks is

currently charged, this statute has been violated.

Each act is

punished no fewer than eleven times. The act of defrauding victim
1 is punished in count I as a second degree felony, and is punished
again in each of counts II through XI to enhance the penalties for
." <
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those communications from a class A misdemeanor level to the second
degree felony level. Each individual act, by itself, could only be
charged as a class A misdemeanor.
IV.

THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE, AS APPLIED HERE
BY THE STATE, VIOLATES THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
PROTECTIONS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The double jeopardy clause provides three protections:
It protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal/-1 It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction.11 And
it protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense.[]
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076,
23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (footnote cites omitted).
Here, each offense of communications fraud is being
punished no less than eleven times, as each is used to increase the
degree of offense for the other ten counts.

This case is thus

distinguishable from the federal sentencing guideline context. In
Witte v. United States. 515 U.S. 389, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 132 L.Ed.2d
3 51 (1995), the Supreme Court rejected a double jeopardy challenge
to prosecution for an offense which had already been considered as
relevant conduct in a prior sentencing. The Court carefully noted
that the relevant conduct was only used to fix the amount of time
that would be served within the authorized statutory range of 5 to
4 0 years.

Thus, the punishment

imposed was solely for the

underlying offense, rather than for the relevant conduct.

The

Court also noted additional safeguards in the sentencing guidelines
to allow a downward departure to "protect petitioner against having
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the length of his sentence multiplied by duplicative consideration
of the same criminal conduct."

Id. at 405.

Here, each act by itself is only punishable as a class A
misdemeanor.

The additional acts are not used solely to fix the

amount of time within the 0-365 day range authorized for class A
misdemeanors, but are instead used to impose additional

punishment

by elevating the offense to the second degree level, and imposing
up to fifteen times the amount of incarceration in the form of an
indeterminate sentence of 1-15 years in prison. Unlike the federal
guidelines, no downward departure is possible to compensate for the
duplicitous charges here. The double jeopardy clauses of the State
and Federal constitutions are violated here.

V.

THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE, AS APPLIED HERE BY
THE STATE, VIOLATES THE SHONDEL DOCTRINE AND THE
RULE OF LENITY.

In State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), the court
held that where two separate statutes penalize the same conduct in
different ways, .the defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty.
Here, the actions of Mr. Bradshaw could be prosecuted under the
communications fraud statute, or as theft by deception.

There is

no question but that, if charged as eleven counts of theft by
deception, each offense would be a class A misdemeanor.

"When

several articles are stolen by the defendant from different owners
on different occasions, multiple larcenies are committed.

It

matters not that the takings occur on the same expedition, and are
committed in rapid succession or in pursuance of a larcenous scheme
6
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or plan."

Charles E. Torcia, 3 Wharton's Criminal Law §347 p. 372

(15'h Ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted) . Accord State v. Gibson, 108 P.
349, 350 (Utah 1910) ("This case is not like that argued to us by
appellant

where

the

successive

larcenies, each

complete

and

distinct, did not constitute one continuous transaction: or where
properties belonging to different persons located at different
places were purloined, and where each asportation constituted a
separate and distinct offense.").
The theft by deception statute clearly proscribes oral
communications used to obtain property by deception.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-6-401 (5) defines deception as occurring when a person
intentionally

"[c]reates or confirms by words or conduct an

impression of law or fact that is false . . ."
occurred here.

Nothing more

The elements are the same, and Mr. Bradshaw is

entitled to the lesser penalty.
The rule of lenity compels the same result.

"It is well

established that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved
in favor of lenity . . . "

State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 564 n.3

(Utah 1987) . Any ambiguity in how the communications fraud statute
should be construed should be resolved in favor of lenity.

Mr.

Bradshaw should be charged with eleven class A misdemeanors.

B.
I.

RACKETEERING COUNT

STATUTORY SCHEME

Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(1) defines an enterprise as
"any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation,
7
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business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities."
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

76-10-1602(2)

defines

pattern

of

unlawful activity as three episodes of unlawful activity with the
same or similar purposes or methods of commission.
The

individual

offenses

that

can constitute

unlawful

activity are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(4), and
include theft, theft by deception, forgery, prostitution, and a
host of other offenses.
Acts prohibited by the statute are set forth in Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1603:
§ 76-10-1603. Unlawful acts
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received
any proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly,
from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the person
has participated as a principal, to use or invest,
directly or indirectly, any part of that income, or the
proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from the
investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern
of unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate,
whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful
activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3).

II.

THE RACKETEERING COUNT SHOULD BE QUASHED, AS THERE
IS NO CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE HERE.
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The racketeering statute prohibits numerous acts, but
none of the prohibited acts have been committed by Mr. Bradshaw
here.

Subsection

(1) prohibits investment of proceeds in an

enterprise or in operation of an enterprise.
enterprise.

Here, there is no

The only argument the State can make is that an

enterprise can be a natural person, and Mr. Bradshaw is the
enterprise. However, it is impossible to invest money in a person,
or to use money to operate a person.
Const, amend. XIII.

Slavery is illegal.

Mr. Bradshaw cannot

U.S.

invest proceeds in

himself, as he cannot be bought or sold. He cannot invest proceeds
to "operate" himself; it takes no money for a person to "operate,"
whatever that may mean.
Finally, the schemes allegedly employed here do not
require any capital.

They consist solely of Mr. Bradshaw making

false representations to the alleged victims, and obtaining money
from

them

as a result.

No proceeds were

invested

in any

enterprise.
Subsection

(2) similarly prohibits acquisition of an

interest in or control of an enterprise through a pattern of
unlawful activity.

Mr. Bradshaw did not and cannot gain a greater

interest in his person. He is a free citizen of the United States.
Subsection (3) is not applicable.
employed

by any enterprise, and

enterprise.

Mr. Bradshaw is not

is not associated

with any

Finally, there is no conspiracy here, and subsection

(4) is inapplicable.
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The State's theory seems to be that Mr. Bradshaw is the
enterprise, and invested proceeds in himself.

While he may have

used the proceeds for his own benefit, none were invested in any
criminal enterprise. The State's interpretation of this statute is
arbitrary and capricious in violation of due process as guaranteed
by U.S. Const, amend. V and XIV and article I, § 7 of the Utah
Constitution.

By the State's reasoning, any prostitute who turns

three tricks is a racketeer.
a racketeer.

A forger who passes three checks is

Likewise, a child who shoplifts bubblegum on three

occasions is a racketeer.

This cannot be what was intended.

This

Court should quash the bindover of the racketeering count.

CONCLUSION

requests

Based

on

that

the

the
Co^rt

foregoing,
quash

Mr.

his

Bradshaw

bindover

on

respectfully
Count

XII,

Racketeering, and that Counts I -through XI each be reduced to
reflect allegations c : class A misdemeanor communications fraud or
class A misdemeanor cheft by deception.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

J
/)

day of May, 2001.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant
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